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1.  Introduction 
 
―Liquidity‖ refers to the ability to trade quickly without moving the price.  In other words, liquidity is the 
ability to trade without the fear of adverse selection on either side of the transaction.  If the buyer is wary 
that he is buying a lemon, he will want the price to be lower.  If the seller is wary that the buyer knows 
more than he does, he may want to wait to learn more before selling.  Liquid markets are ones in which 
there is immediacy without a price impact.  The market for sale and repurchase agreements (the ―repo‖ 
market) is a market of trillions of dollars where there is little or no due diligence.
1  It is a very liquid 
market, usually. Another very liquid market is the exchange of goods for checks (demand deposits).  
Repo and checks are both forms of money.   There have always been difficulties creating private money 
(like demand deposits) and this time around was no different.  Like the banking panics in U.S. history, at 
the core of the current financial crisis is a problem with private money creation.  In banking crises these 
markets fail to function; it is said that ―liquidity dries up‖ because of a ―loss of confidence.‖  In this paper 
we investigate what this means in the context of the financial crisis.  We explain the problem and provide 
some evidence for our explanation. 
 
Traditional  banking  is  centered  on  taking  deposits,  which  are  a  form  of  money.    Checks  are  easily 
transferable now because they are insured by the government, so their value is never in question.  Prior to 
the 1934 adoption of deposit insurance in the U.S., demand deposits were designed to try to privately 
create confidence in their value.  Demand deposits are a form of debt which allows the depositor the right 
to withdraw cash at any time (i.e., they are very short maturity); they are backed by the assets of the bank, 
including reserves and loans. The idea was to create a medium of exchange, that is, a security that would 
be easily accepted in transactions, without needing to do extensive and costly due diligence on the bank. 
If the design was successful, checks would be used with confidence in their value without extensive due 
diligence. The traditional problem with demand deposits was that sometimes this confidence disappeared. 
There were banking panics, events in which depositors en masse ran to their banks and demanded cash for 
their checking accounts.  Banks, having lent the money out, had illiquid loans, and could not honor the 
demands of their depositors: the banking system was insolvent.  This is the problem that deposit insurance 
stopped. 
 
The private money that is our focus in this paper is sale and repurchase agreements (―repo‖) which, as we 
explain below, are a kind of money for institutional investors and nonfinancial firms which need a way to 
safely store cash and earn some interest.  In a repo transaction a ―depositor‖ deposits money at a financial 
institution and receives collateral, valued at market prices. The transaction is short term, so the depositor 
can ―withdraw‖ the money at any time.  The deposit is backed by the bonds received as collateral from 
the institution where the money is deposited.  There may be overcollateralization if the market value of 
the bonds received exceeds the deposit.  For example, if $90 million is deposited and $100 million of 
bonds are received, then there is a ―haircut‖ or initial margin of 10 percent.  This is akin to bank capital 
or a reserve fund as the 10 percent is junior in seniority to the depositor’s 90 percent claim.  So, repo is 
similar to demand deposits in important ways, and consequently was counted in the Federal Reserve 
System’s monetary aggregate M3 (since discontinued). 
 
                                                           
1 Terms in bold may be unfamiliar to some readers and are defined in the Glossary at the end. 2 
 
Historically, securities that function as money have certain specific properties.  They are debt; they are 
short-term,  and  they  are  backed  by  diversified  portfolios.    Gorton  and  Pennacchi  (1990)  and  Dang, 
Gorton, and Holmström (2009) have described the production of this type of debt as the creation of 
information-insensitive securities. ―Information insensitivity‖ means that the securities are immune from 
adverse selection when trading. This is what is meant by a liquid market: trading can occur quickly 
without loss to insiders. In a liquid market, no agent finds it profitable to produce private information 
about these securities.  In short, you can trade and not be taken advantage of.  However, if an economic 
shock is large enough then debt that was information-insensitive becomes information-sensitive.  This is 
the loss of confidence. When this loss of confidence occurs, fear of adverse selection reduces liquidity. In 
this paper we further investigate some of the details of this argument. 
 
 
2.  Panics in U.S. History 
 
In U.S. history periodic banking panics are the norm and this history can offer some useful insights for 
understanding the current crisis.  For example, during the U.S. National Banking Era, 1863-1913, there 
were seven nation-wide banking panics.  And, of course, there was the Great Depression in the 1930s.  A 
banking panic starts at the peak of the business cycle when macroeconomic information signals a coming 
recession.    The  signal  or  economic  shock  causes  concerns  about  the  value  of  demand  deposits  that 
previously were thought of as completely safe.  Upon learning of the coming downturn depositors ran to 
their banks to withdraw cash, concerned that banks would fail in the coming recession. See Gorton 
(1988).  Faced with massive demands for cash, the banking system is insolvent because it cannot honor 
these contractual demands with respect to demand deposits; the money has been lent out and cannot be 
recalled and the loans cannot be sold.  The banking system is illiquid, and consequently is insolvent when 
a panic occurs. There is no private agent capable of buying the assets of the banking system at a price that 
allows banks to honor their contractual demands.  This is the essence of a systemic event. 
 
The  information  that  depositors  received  was  aggregate  information,  not  specific  information  about 
individual banks. People knew that a recession was coming and that in a recession some banks were likely 
to fail, but no one knew which banks.  So, it was rational to take the precautionary action of withdrawing 
from all banks.  The shock threshold was literally large enough to cause a panic. 
 
This is related to the function of money, discussed above.  Banks try to produce securities that are useful 
for transacting, namely bank debt – demand deposits. But, in a panic, people lose confidence in the value 
of bank debt.  Bank debt that was previously viewed as ―safe‖ becomes viewed with suspicion.  In this 
context, ―safe‖ means two, related, things.  First, the value of the bank debt does not change much, a ten 
dollar check is pretty much always worth ten dollars. And, second, because of this it is not susceptible to 
adverse selection when it is used in transactions (traded in markets).  That is, it does not pay anyone to 
produce private information about the value of the bank debt and speculate on that information. 
 
During the National Banking Era there was no central bank to act as a lender-of-last-resort.  So, what 
happened  during  a  panic?  During  the  19
th  century  the  banks  themselves  developed  increasingly 
sophisticated ways to respond to panics. The response was centered on private bank clearinghouses. 
Originally organized to be an efficient way to clear checks, these coalitions or clubs of banks evolved into 
much  more.  Clearinghouses  tried  to  recreate  the  information-insensitivity  of  demand  deposits  by 3 
 
increasing the diversity of the portfolio backing demand deposits.  First, in response to a panic, banks 
would  jointly  suspend  convertibility  of  deposits  into  currency.    Coincident  with  this,  clearinghouse 
member banks joined together to form a new entity overseen by the Clearinghouse Committee. The 
clearinghouse would also cease the publication of individual bank accounting information (which banks 
were  normally  required  by  the  clearinghouse  to  publish  in  the  newspapers)  and  would  instead  only 
publish the aggregate information of all the members.  Finally, the clearinghouse issued new money 
called clearinghouse loan certificates directly to the public in small denominations. See Gorton (1985).  
These were liabilities of the clearinghouse members jointly –not liabilities of any individual bank--and 
served the purpose of providing a kind of deposit insurance. The clearinghouse loan certificate was a 
remarkable innovation, resulting from individual private banks finding a way to essentially become a 




3.  Securitized Banking and Repo as Money 
 
The limits on deposit insurance make bank accounts inadequate for large depositors, like institutional 
investors or firms.  But, they have a need for a short-term, safe, interest-bearing place to store money.  A 
repurchase  agreement  (or  ―repo‖)  is  a  financial  contract  used  by  market  participants  as  a  financing 
method  to  meet  short  and  long-term  liquidity  needs.    In  a  repo  transaction  there  are  two  parties, 
essentially  the  ―bank‖  or  ―borrower‖  and  another  party,  the  ―depositor‖  or  ―lender.‖  The  depositor 
deposits money and in exchange for the cash the bank provides bonds as collateral to back the deposit.  
The depositor earns interest, the repo rate.  Repo is typically short-term, often overnight, so the money 
can be withdrawn easily by not renewing or ―rolling‖ the repo.  There is no government guarantee, but 
there is collateral, value at market prices.  Depositors take delivery of the collateral, so they have it in 
their  possession.  The  bonds  that  the  depositor  receives  can  be  ―spent‖  in  that  they  can  be  used  as 
collateral in another, unrelated, transaction.  For example, the bonds could be posted as collateral against 
a derivatives position.  The reuse of collateral is called ―rehypothecation.‖ 
 
Another important feature of repo, one which will play an important role shortly, concerns the ―haircut.‖  
To reiterate, here’s the previous example. A large investor, for example, may deposit $100 million and 
receive bonds worth $100 million.  This is a case of a zero ―haircut.‖  If the depositor deposits only $90 
million and takes $100 million (market value) of bonds as collateral, there is a 10 percent haircut.  In that 
case, the bank has to finance the other $10 million in some other way, issuing new liabilities.  
 
The similarities between repo and demand deposits are apparent, and indeed the Federal Reserve counted 
repo transactions as money in a monetary aggregate called M3.  However, the Fed only counted the repo 
transactions that were done by the primary security dealers that trade with the Fed, not the entire market.  
M3 was discontinued on March 23, 2006.
2  See http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/discm3.htm . 
 
                                                           
2 ―M3 did not appear to convey any additional information about economic activity that was not already embodied 
in  M2.  Consequently,  the  Board  judged  that  the  costs  of  collecting  the  data  and  publishing  M3  outweigh  the 
benefits.‖ See http://www.ny.frb.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed49.html .   4 
 
While there are no official statistics on the size of the repo market, it is likely to be about $12 trillion, 
compared to the total assets in the U.S. banking system of $10 trillion.  According to Hördahl and King 
(2008), ―the (former) top U.S. investment banks funded roughly half of their assets using repo markets, 
with additional exposure due to off-balance sheet financing of their customers‖ (p. 39).  Hördahl and King 
(2008) also report that repo markets have doubled in size since 2002, ―with gross amounts outstanding at 
year-end 2007 of roughly $10 trillion in each of the U.S. and euro markets, and another $1 trillion in the 
UK repo market‖ (p. 37).  They report that the U.S. repo market exceeded $10 trillion in mid-2008, 
including double counting. Also, see King (2008). 
 
An important feature of the repo market is that the collateral was very often securitized bonds.  These are 
the liabilities of a special purpose vehicle (SPV), which finances a large portfolio of loans (e.g., home 
mortgages, auto loans, credit card receivables) by issuing tranches (bonds) in the capital markets. The 
tranches are based on seniority, but all tranches are investment-grade.  The sponsoring firm, i.e., the 
originator of the loans in the underlying portfolio, holds the equity residual, and there may be other credit 
enhancements to ensure that the tranches are investment-grade.  See Gorton and Souleles (2006).  While 
the internal structure of these transactions is complicated, the tranches were designed to, in effect, be 
information-insensitive.  The  securitization  of  non-mortgage  loans is  called  asset-backed  securities 
(ABS), while portfolios of residential mortgages are residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS).  
Similarly, commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) are claims on portfolios of commercial 
mortgages. 
 
One of the asset classes that was securitized was subprime mortgages. As explained by Gorton (2008), the 
innovation was to structure the mortgage to effectively make the maturity two or three years.  This was 
accomplished with a fixed initial period interest rate,  but then at the ―reset date‖ having the rate rise 
significantly, essentially requiring the borrower to refinance the mortgage.  With rising home prices, 
borrowers would build equity in their homes and would be able to refinance.  In the years 2001-2006, 
about $2.5 trillion of subprime mortgages were originated.
3  In 2005 and 2006, a total of $1.2 trillion of 
subprime mortgages were originated, a large portion of which was likely refinancings of previous 
mortgages. An important part of the subprime mortgage innovation was how the mortgages were 
financed.    In  2005  and  2006,  about  80  percent  of  the  subprime  mortgages  were  financed  via 
securitization, that is, the mortgages were sold in residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), which 
involves pooling thousands of mortgages together, selling the pool to a  special purpose vehicle which 
finance their purchase  by  issuing  securities  with  different seniority  (called ―tranches‖) in the capital 
markets. 
Securitization is a very important sector of U.S. capital markets, as the figure below shows.  Shown are 
the issuance amounts, annually, of all U.S. corporate debt (investment-grade and below investment-grade) 
and all private securitization issuance.  The effects of the crisis are also apparent, a manifestation of the 
loss of confidence to be discussed shortly. 
 
 
                                                           
3 See Inside Mortgage Finance, The 2007 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, Key Data (2006), Joint Economic 
Committee (October 2007). 5 
 




Source: Thomson Reuters 
 
Gorton and Metrick (2009) label institutions that finance their portfolios of securitized bonds via repo as 
securitized banks, to distinguish them from the traditional depository institutions that are regulated.  We 
now turn to the question of the vulnerability of securitized banks to runs. 
 
 
4.  Repo Haircuts: Trying to Re-Create Information Insensitivity and Hence Liquidity 
 
How could problems with subprime mortgages have caused a global financial crisis?  Gorton (2009) 
likens subprime to E-coli: there doesn’t have to be a lot of it for everyone to fear eating certain foods and 
avoid those foods.  The problem with subprime, as with E-coli, was that no one knew where the risks 
actually were, so there was no certainty about which counterparties would fail (and unlike food, subprime 
mortgages cannot be recalled).  Unlike food the subprime mortgage-related assets could not be recalled.  
In the pre-Fed era, depositors knew that not all banks were going to fail in the recession.  But, they did not 
know which banks were more likely to fail, and so they ran on all banks. 
In the current crisis repo depositors did not know which securitized banks were most likely to fail (or 
whether the Fed would let them fail).  More specifically, the concern was not directly about the bank 
defaulting, because repo is collateralized, but about being able to recover the collateral value when selling 6 
 
it in the market if the bank did default.
4 Gorton (2009) and Gorton and Metrick (2009) argue that the 
current financial crisis is a bank run.  The run corresponds to repo haircuts increasing, causing massive 
deleveraging. The collapse of the repo market is the systemic event.  
In this section we provide some ev idence on the run on repo.  If there is a sufficiently bad economic 
shock, then debt cannot be traded without creating adverse selection.   This can cause  information-
insensitive  securities  to  become  information-sensitive.  Traders  then  have  an  incentive  to  produce 
information.   If that happens, then trade is reduced due to a fear of adverse selection. Liquidity dries up.  
One way to partially overcome this problem is for traders  to re-create information-insensitive securities 
by taking a senior tranche of the original bond.   In the repo market this concretely corresponds to a 
haircut. A haircut means that the bank taking the deposit has to over -collateralize the deposit.  And this 
implies that the bank must hold more equity in the collateral. 
 
Keep in mind that the collateral offered in repo is valued at market prices.  If the bonds become riskier, 
and their prices go down, then they would be valued at these lower prices.  Furthermore, if there is more 
uncertainty about their price in the future, that risk can be addressed with a higher repo rate.  Repo rates 
can and did go up (see Gorton and Metrick (2009)).  Why should repo collateral be haircut?  And wh y 
should these haircuts go up?  Our answer, following Dang, Gorton, and Holmström (2009), is that a 
haircut amounts to a tranching of the collateral to recreate an information-insensitive security so that it is 
liquid.  The risk that is relevant here is different than the risks we usually think about, which are related to 
the payoff on the security. A haircut addresses the risk that if the holder of the bond in repo, the depositor, 
has to sell a bond in the market to get the cash bank , he may face a better informed trader resulting in a 
loss (relative to the true value of the security).  This risk is endogenous to the trading process.  It is not the 
risk of loss due to default. Consequently, the price cannot adjust to address this risk. 
 
One way to protect against this endogenous adverse selection risk is to require overcollateralization, that 
is, an increase in the initial margin or ―haircut.‖  The depositor deposits less than the market value of the 
bond, but has the bond as collateral.  From the bank’s point of view, the entity funding the bond, this 
means that for a bond worth $100, only an amount less than that can be borrowed, perhaps $95, i.e., a 
haircut of 5 percent.  We test this proposition in the cross section by looking at the haircuts over the 
course of the crisis for different categories of structured products.  In particular, we examine whether the 
―closer‖ the security is to subprime the sooner and the higher the repo haircut on that collateral.  The 
haircuts should be higher for asset classes that are more prone to be sensitive to subprime mortgage risk. 
 
During the crisis repo haircuts were different for different asset classes, in particular, different categories 
of structured products, including asset-backed securities (ABS), residential mortgage-backed securities 
(RMBS), commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), and 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).  Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), are special purpose 
vehicles that issue long-dated liabilities in the form of rated tranches in the capital markets and use the 
                                                           
4 Sale and repurchase agreements, like derivatives, have a special status under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code; they are 
exempted  from  the  automatic  stay.  Under  the  standard  documentation  the  nondefaulting  party  to  a  repurchase 
agreement is allowed to unilaterally enforce the termination provisions of the agreement as a result of a bankruptcy 
filing by the other party and keep the cash or the bond, as the case may be. 7 
 
proceeds to purchase structured products for assets. In particular, ABS (asset-backed securities) CDOs 
purchased significant amounts of subprime RMBS bonds.   See Gorton (2008). 
 
The  data  we  will  examine  is  the  interbank  repo  haircuts  on  the  following  asset  classes,  further 
characterized  by  their  ratings:  (1)  A-AAA  ABS  Auto/Credit  cards/Student  loans;  (2)  AA-AAA 
RMBS/CMBS; (3) < A RMBS/CMBS; (4) AA-AAA CLO; (5) Unpriced ABS/MBS/All Subprime; (6) 
AA-AAA CDOs; (7) Unpriced CLOs/CDOs.  ―Unpriced‖ means that the collateral does not have public 
pricing on Reuters or Bloomberg. Of these categories, those numbered (1) – (4) are not subprime-related; 
they do not contain subprime mortgages. We label this group ―Non-Subprime-Related.‖  The RMBS 
referred to in categories (2) and (3) are prime mortgages, not subprime. Categories (5) – (7) are either 
directly  subprime  or  contain  subprime.  Collateralized  debt  obligations (CDOs),  in particular, contain 
some subprime. Also, using all seven categories we also construct an equally-weighted average repo 
haircut index for structured bonds. 
 
In the pre-crisis period, harircuts were zero for all the asset classes. This is consistent with the repo 
market being based on information-insensitive assets backing ―deposits.‖  The figure below shows the 
haircuts for the Non-Subprime-Related Group, the Subprime-Related Group, and the average of all the 
categories. 





The  figure  confirms  that  haircuts  were  higher  on  subprime-related  asset  classes.  In  fact,  the  haircut 
eventually went to 100 percent, that is, these assets were not acceptable as collateral in repo.  The non-
subprime-related asset classes reached a maximum of a 20 percent haircut.  
 
To reiterate the argument, if these asset classes simply became riskier in the usual finance sense, then that 
would be reflected in their market prices – which are the basis for the collateral to start with.  So, that 
cannot  be  an  explanation  for  these  haircuts.    Instead,  the  haircuts  are  consistent  with  the  idea  that 
depositors want collateral that is ―safe‖ in the very specific sense that it is immune to adverse selection, 
and is hence liquid. 
The figure is a picture of the securitized-bank ―run on repo.‖  Each ―depositor‖ imposes a haircut to 
protect himself against the possible effects of adverse selection.  But, for the system as a whole the 
implications are devastating.  To understand the impact of this run on repo, take the estimate of the size of 
the repo market to be $10 trillion, the same size as the total assets in the regulated banking sector.
5  If the 
average haircut goes from zero (pre -crisis) to, say,  an average of  20 percent during the crisis,  then $2 
trillion is the amount that  the securitized banking system needs to find from other sources to fund i ts 
assets. Obviously, if the average haircut goes to 40 percent, then $4 trillion has to be raised.  The only 
route available for these banks to make up the difference was asset sales, which caused a further 
downward movement in the prices of these asset c lasses, making them less usable as collateral, causing 
further sales, and so on.  The securitized bank syste m is then effectively insolvent, as was the banking 
system during the pre-Fed panics. 
The figure also displays a loss of confidence in the sense tha t the Non-Subprime-Related Group faced 
very significant haircuts even though it has nothing to do with subprime.  It is simply also securitized.  It 
is similar to sales of bagged lettuce dropping when the Food and Drug Administration announces that 
there E-coli in bagged spinach.  To see this loss of confidence, let’s compare the average haircut on 
structured products to the haircut on corporate bonds.  This is done in Figure 3. 
                                                           
5 This is the number that most repo traders give as an estimate. 9 
 





All investment-grade corporate bonds were treated the same with regard to haircuts.  Corporate bonds are 
clearly not claims on portfolios of loans like structured securitized bonds are, so in that sense maybe they 
are riskier.  But, the point is that there was no contagious affect of subprime on corporate bonds, although 
their haircuts did go from zero to a peak of two and half percent. 
 
The discussion above addressed the question of why haircuts should increase.  In the context of traditional 
finance there is no explanation.  Corporate debt is, by definition, a ―haircut‖ on the firm’s assets.  In fact, 
the idea of creating information-insensitive debt in this way is quite familiar.  The distinction drawn 
between  information-sensitive  and  information-insensitive  has  a  familiar  counterpart,  namely,  the 
distinction  between investment-grade  debt  and  below  investment-grade  debt. While  investment-grade 
debt is not money, it is well-known that there is a large gap – by many measures (spread, likelihood of 
default)—between these two broad rating categories.  This has been confirmed empirically.  Studies of 
corporate  bond  returns  and  bond  yield  changes  have  mainly  concluded  that  investment-grade  bonds 
behave like Treasury bonds, reacting to (riskless) interest rate movements, while below investment-grade 
bonds (junk bonds) are more sensitive to stock returns, reacting to information about the firm.
6  Corporate 
                                                           
6 Studies of the relation between stock and bond returns at the aggregate level include, e.g., Keim and Stambaugh 
(1986) and Fama and French (1989, 1993), and at the portfolio level they include, and firm level e.g., Blume, Keim, 
and Patel (1991), and Cornell and Green (1991); at the individual level, see, e.g., Kwan (1996). 10 
 
debt  is  not  money,  but  the  gap  between  investment-grade  and  below  investment-grade  suggests  an 
important informational line. Senior corporate debt has some features of the kind of debt that is needed 
for transactions; it is an intermediate case.  Kwan (1996b) writes: ―It appears that AAA-rated bonds may 
have so little default risk relative to stocks that they are insensitive to information about the issuing firm.‖ 
 
The analysis above suggests that the line between information-insensitive and information-sensitive has 
moved due to the subprime shock.  Previously information-insensitive tranches are now sensitive. If this 
is the case, then we should see the effects in terms of prices or spreads.  In other words, the spreads on 
some securitized asset class tranches should be much higher and remain higher.  We can examine this by 
looking at what has happened to the difference in spreads on different levels of seniority for the same 
asset class.  We will look at the difference between the spread on the BBB tranche and the AAA tranche 
of 5-year credit card ABS.  We will compare that to the difference in spread between the BBB-rated 
industrial firm bond spread and the AAA-rated industrial firm bond spread at the 5-year horizon.  The 
spread differences are expressed in basis points.  (These are on-the-run bonds.)  Finally, we will look at 
the spread difference between LIBOR and the overnight index swap rate.  This last spread difference is 
a proxy for counterparty risk in the interbank market.  The LIBOR minus OIS spread (LIB-OIS) should 
be zero by no arbitrage.  See Gorton and Metrick (2009).  But, if there is counterparty risk, it can become 
positive. 




The  figure  shows  that  the  difference  between  BBB-rated  industrial  bond  spreads  and  AAA-rated 
industrial bond spreads moves with the measure of counterparty risk, coming down when LIB-OIS came 
down.  But, this is not true for the credit card ABS spread differential between the BBB-rated tranche and 11 
 
the AAA-rated tranche.  This suggests – but is clearly not definitive – that there has been a kind of regime 




5.  Discussion 
 
Increases in repo haircut are withdrawals from securitized banks, a bank run.  When everyone does this 
and the haircuts are high enough, the securitized banking system cannot finance itself and is forced to sell 
assets, driving down asset prices. The assets become information-sensitive; liquidity dries up. Like the 
panics of the 19
th century, the system is insolvent. 
 
Liquidity requires symmetric information, which is easiest to achieve when everyone is ignorant.  This 
determines many securities’ design including the design of debt and securitization.  The idea is to design 
securities such that it doesn’t pay to speculate in these bonds.  They are information-insensitive. Then 
they are easy to trade; they are liquid. This idea (of Dang, Gorton, and Holmström (2009)) is the basis of 
our look at some repo haircut data.  When the asymmetric information about the location of subprime 
risks became pressing, increasing haircuts was a way to re-create, through re-tranching, information-
insensitive  debt.  This  was  most  true  for  subprime-related  asset  classes,  but  also  occurred  with  non-
subprime-related structured asset classes. The spreads seem to reflect the now information-sensitive status 





























Asset-Backed Securities (ABS):  An asset-backed security is a bond which is backed by the cash flows 
from  a  pool  of  specified  assets  in  a  special  purpose  vehicle  rather  than  the  general  credit  of  a 
corporation.  The asset pools may be residential mortgages, in which case it is a residential mortgage-
backed security (RMBS), commercial mortgages – a commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS), 
automobile loans, credit card receivables, student loans, aircraft leases, royalty payments, and many other 
asset classes. 
 
Basis Point (bp): A basis point is one hundredth of a percentage point (0.01%). 
 
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs): A CDO is a special purpose vehicle, which buys a portfolio of 
fixed income assets, and finances the purchase of the portfolio via issuing different tranches of risk in the 
capital markets. These tranches are senior tranches, rated Aaa/AAA, mezzanine tranches, rated Aa/AA to 
Ba/BB, and equity tranches (unrated).  ABS CDOs are CDOs which have underlying portfolios consisting 
of  asset-backed  securities  (ABS),  including  residential  mortgage-backed  securities  (RMBS)  and 
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS). 
 
Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs): A CLO is a special purpose vehicle, which buys a portfolio of 
bank loans, and finances the purchase of the portfolio via issuing different tranches of risk in the capital 
markets. These tranches are senior tranches, rated Aaa/AAA, mezzanine tranches, rated Aa/AA to Ba/BB, 
and equity tranches (unrated).   
 
Commercial Mortgage-backed Securities (CMBS): See asset-backed securities, above. 
 
Haircut or initial margin: The percentage by which an asset’s market value is reduced for the purpose of 
calculating the amount of overcollateralization of the repo agreement. 
 
LIBOR: The London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is a series of interest rates, of different maturities 
and currencies, at which banks offer to lend fund to each other.  These rates are calculated by the British 
Bankers’ Association as the averages of quotes contributed by a panel of banks and announced at 11:00 
Am local time in England.  This is called the rate ―fixing.‖ Quotes are ranked and the top and bottom 
quartiles are discarded.  LIBOR is fixed for 15 different maturities, from overnight to one year, and in ten 
international currencies.  Similar fixing arrangements exist in many  markets around the world.  See 
Gyntelberg and Wooldridge (2008). 
 
Overnight Index Swap (OIS): An Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS) is a fixed/floating interest rate swap 
where the floating leg of the swap is tied to a published index of a daily overnight rate reference. The 
term  ranges  from  one  week  to  two  years  (sometimes  more).  At  maturity,  the  two  parties  agree  to 
exchange the difference between the interest accrued at the agreed fixed rate and interest accrued through 
geometric averaging of the floating index rate on the agreed notional amount. This means that the floating 
rate calculation replicates the accrual on an amount (principal plus interest) rolled at the index rate every 
business day over the term of the swap. If cash can be borrowed by the swap receiver on the same 
maturity as the swap and at the same rate and lent back every day in the market at the index rate, the cash 13 
 
payoff  at  maturity  will  exactly  match  the  swap  payout:  the  OIS  acts  as  a  perfect  hedge  for  a  cash 
instrument. Since indices are generally constructed on the basis of the average of actual transactions, the 
index is generally achievable by borrowers and lenders. Economically, receiving the fixed rate in an OIS 
is like lending cash. Paying the fixed rate in an OIS is like borrowing cash. Settlement occurs net on the 
earliest practical date. There is no exchange of principal. The index rate used is typically the weighted 
average rate for overnight transactions as published by the central bank (e.g., the effective fed funds rate). 
 
Rehypothecation: ―Hypothecate‖ means to pledge collateral.  Rehypothecation is the practice of re-using 
(or  re-pledging)  collateral  received  in  one  transaction  with  an  unrelated  third  party  in  an  unrelated 
transaction. See Singh and Aitken (2009) and Johnson (1997). 
Residential Mortgage-backed Security (RMBS):  See asset-backed securities, above. 
 
Sale and Repurchase Agreements (repo):  A sale and repurchase agreement, known as a ―repo‖ for 
short, is a sale of a security combined with an agreement to repurchase the same security at a specified 
price at the end of the contract.  Economically, a repo is a secured or collateralized loan, that is, a loan of 
cash against a security as collateral.  From the point of view of the borrower of the cash (who is putting 
up the security as collateral), it is a reverse repurchase agreement, or ―reverse repo.‖  The collateral 
pledged by borrowers towards the repo sometimes has a ―haircut‖ or ―initial margin‖ applied, which 
means  the  collateral  is  valued  at  slightly  less  than  market  value.  This  haircut  reflects  the  perceived 
underlying risk of the collateral and protects the lender against a change in its value. Haircuts are different 
for different asset classes and ratings. 
 
Securitization: The process of financing by segregating specified cash flows, from loans originated by a 
firm  (the  ―sponsor‖)  and  selling  claims  specifically  linked  to  these  specified  cash  flows.  This  is 
accomplished by setting up another company, called a special purpose vehicle (SPV) or special purpose 
entity, and then selling the specified cash flows to this company, which purchases the rights to the cash 
flows by issuing (rated) securities into the capital market.  The sponsor services the cash flows, that is, 
makes sure that the cash flows are arriving, etc.  
 
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV): An SPV or special purpose entity (SPE) is a legal entity which has been 
set up for a specific, limited, purpose by another entity, the sponsoring firm. An SPV can take the form of 
a corporation, trust, partnership, or a limited liability company. The SPV may be a subsidiary of the 
sponsoring firm, or it may be an ―orphan‖ SPV, one that is not consolidated with the sponsoring firm for 
tax, accounting, or legal purposes (or may be consolidated for some purposes but not others).  An SPV 
can only carry out some specific purpose, or circumscribed activity, or a series of such transactions.  The 
SPV is not an operating company in the usual sense.  It is more of a robot company in that it is a set of 
rules.  It has no employees or physical location.  An essential feature of an SPV is that it be ―bankruptcy 
remote,‖ that is, that the SPV never be able to become legally bankrupt.  The most straightforward way to 
achieve this would be for the SPV to waive its right to file a voluntary bankruptcy petition, but this is 
legally unenforceable. The only way to completely eliminate the risk of either voluntary or involuntary 
bankruptcy is to create the SPV in a legal form that is ineligible to be a debtor under the U.S. Bankruptcy 
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